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Abstract
This paper studies the interaction between international migration and intellectual property rights (IPR)
in determining innovation performance of developing countries. Although emigration may directly cause
brain drain, it generates a flow of knowledge acquired by emigrants abroad back to their home countries,
which could be exploited under sound IPR institutions. IPRs can thus stimulate domestic innovation
by creating the right environment to absorb potential gains from international migration. Using a panel
dataset of emerging and developing countries, we show that emigration has a favorable effect on strength-
ening the link between IPR protection and innovation by making a new source of knowledge available
to domestic innovators. We test our results through instrumental variable methods using information on
geography, cultural distance and institutions.
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1. Introduction
The recent surge in the outward transfer of human capital has made emigration a key concern for
the developing world (Docquier and Rapoport, 2012). This process has given origin to a rich debate on
the threats and opportunities that skilled emigration may pose to the sending countries. The traditional
literature on migration and brain drain presents mechanisms through which skilled emigration could be
detrimental to growth.1 A growing number of contributions, however, have introduced channels through
which emigration may foster development and create brain gain. These include incentives for education
attainment through migration prospects (Mountford, 1997; Beine et al., 2001, 2008; Stark et al., 2007),
return migration of better trained managers and entrepreneurs (Mayr and Peri, 2009; Dustmann et al.,
2011), and access to foreign-produced knowledge by means of cross-border diaspora networks (Kerr, 2008;
Agrawal et al., 2011).
There is little doubt today about the contribution of emigration in creating potential gains for the
home economy.2 Nevertheless, there is little formal research on the role of home country institutions in
moderating a link between the knowledge absorbed by emigrants abroad and innovation in their home
countries. This study seeks to fill this gap by exploring the interaction between intellectual property
right (IPR) protection and migration in determining innovation performance in emerging and developing
countries (EDCs).3 The key question we aim to answer is whether an appropriate level of IPR protection
in the sending country could stimulate domestic innovation by creating the right environment to exploit
superior knowledge acquired through migration to more advanced economies. In sum, we argue that
although emigration may directly result in a brain drain, it also generates a flow of ideas and inventions
back to the sending country, which could be absorbed in countries with sound IPR institutions.
The roles of IPRs and migration as means of technology diffusion have generally been studied in
isolation of each other.4 Among the vast literature on IPRs, Chen and Puttinan (2005) and Parello (2008)
are perhaps most closely related to our work, as they specifically focus on domestic skill accumulation and
1See e.g. Berry and Soligo (1969), Bhagwati and Hamada (1974) and Miyagiwa (1991).
2Referring to Agrawal et al. (2011), The Economist (2009) writes: ”[...] a scientific diaspora gives countries of origin
a leg-up in terms of access to the latest research, mitigating some of the problems of a ’brain drain’. And given that the
same scientist is going to be more productive in America than in a developing country because of better facilities and
more resources, immigration may help overall innovation (some of the benefits of which may flow back to firms in poorer
countries).” See also ‘The Magic of Diasporas’ in The Economist (2011).
3When dealing with technology transfer and innovation in the developing world, intellectual property rights protection is
certainly a crucial institution to consider (Maskus, 2000).
4Only two theoretical contributions to our knowledge have looked at both in the same context, namely Mondal and Gupta
(2008) and McAusland and Kuhn (2011).
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innovation. While the former positively relates IPR protection to innovation, the latter finds it ineffective
for innovation in less-developed countries. On migration, Williams (2007) and Oettl and Agrawal (2008)
focus on the externalities of international migration to emphasize their role in knowledge and technology
transfer. Our work contributes to this literature by shedding light on how migration may influence the
effect of IPR protection on innovation in the sending country.
The conceptual framework we adopt argues that although emigration can initially result in the loss
of domestically available skills, it also instigates a channel through which more advanced knowledge
acquired by emigrants abroad can flow back to the developing world. This can for instance be made
possible through the remote mobilization of intellectuals and professionals abroad and their connection
to scientific, technological, and cultural programs at home.5 We first argue in line with Agrawal et al.
(2011) that the capacity of innovators who remain in their origin countries is related to their access to
valuable technological knowledge that is partially accumulated abroad (i.e., brain banks). We then claim
that the diaspora knowledge partially makes up for the lacking innovation capacity in the home country
that can be utilized under a sound IPR regime. In other words, migration increases the magnitude of
potential benefits from IPR protection in terms of innovation in developing economies.
Using a sample of emerging and developing countries, we perform an empirical analysis to investigate
the joint impact of emigration and IPR protection in the sending country on innovation there. The sample
we use is a panel of 34 low-income countries ranging from 1995 to 2006. We measure innovation activities
in EDCs through the number of resident patent grants, with data taken from WIPO (World Intellectual
Property Organization). We use this information together with extensive original data on migration
stocks and the index of IPR protection as measured by Park (2008). Our findings show that emigration
has a favorable effect on strengthening the link between IPR protection and innovation by making a new
source of knowledge available to domestic innovators. Hence, benefits of IPRs can be better seized in the
presence of diaspora knowledge networks, confirming the main conclusions of our conceptual framework.
Our results are tested using a variety of robustness checks that are also able to address a potential
omitted variable bias. Indeed, in the presence of omitted variables, the causal mechanism we highlight may
not necessarily be the driver of our correlations. In particular, there can be a host of unobserved factors,
which may trigger emigration and are at the same time correlated with innovation. For instance, countries
5Student/scholarly networks, local associations of skilled expatriates, short-term consultancies by high-skilled expatriots
in their country of origins, and other unestablished intellectual/scientific diaspora networks are a few examples of such
networks (Meyer and Brown, 1999).
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with superior innovation capabilities could be better able to send migrants to more advanced countries.
Although we provide a variety of controls, among which trade and FDI tend to play an important role,
we certainly cannot exclude the possibility that some key factors remain unobserved. We address these
concerns via a first difference as well as an instrumental variables approach. Our instrumental variables
estimates use information on geography, cultural distance and institutions. These methods allow us to
validate the importance of IPRs in transforming skills learned from abroad by emigrants and transferred
back to their home country into successful innovations.
In the remainder of the paper, we introduce the conceptual framework and main empirical implications
in Sections 2, conduct the empirical exercise in Section 3, and conclude in Section 4.
2. Conceptual Framework and Main Empirical Implications
Diasporas help spread ideas by promoting trust through ethnic ties, speeding the flow of information,
and through the return of better trained and more experienced migrants to their home countries. The
conceptual framework presented in this section shows how this relates to the IPR regime in the sending
country. We argue that IPR protection influences a country’s potential for innovation by increasing the
absorptive capacity in the country of origin, thus enabling them to exploit the benefits that arise from
cross-border diaspora networks.
Although the immediate consequence of skilled migration is a brain drain, migrants are provided
with the opportunity to learn better skills and up-to-date technologies in more advanced countries. The
knowledge acquired abroad can in turn flow back to the country of origin. This can happen through
different channels. The most direct channel is the physical return of the brains, as is the case with
the domination of China’s technology industry by return migrants (sea turtles). A secondary route is the
recirculation of knowledge back to the country of origin with a good illustrative example being the frequent
interaction between Indian computer scientists in Bangalore and their counterparts in Silicon Valley. Both
phenomena also implicitly involve access to foreign-produced knowledge through trade and investment
activities of cross-border diaspora networks (Agrawal et al., 2011). In this way, skilled emigrants foster
technology diffusion through the return of newly learned information and skills to their home economy
(Kerr, 2008).
The protection of IPRs creates incentives to innovate by granting monopoly rights to inventors through
a patent. A strong IPR regime hence increases returns from skills, creating stimulus for innovation and
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rendering skilled occupations more attractive. However, this does not necessarily translate into innovation
in developing countries without access to more advanced foreign technologies.6 Diaspora networks create
this possibility by generating knowledge flows from their host to their home countries. Only then can IPRs
instigate domestic innovation by creating the basic absorptive capacity needed in the home country. IPR
protection therefore creates the conditions for an effective innovation sector, in terms of either industrial
development or foreign direct investment prospects, and employs workers into skilled occupations that can
benefit from diasporas. Our idea somewhat complements Chen and Puttinan (2005), who illustrate how a
stronger IPR regime encourages a shift from the imitation of foreign technologies to domestic innovation
in developing countries. Our analysis adds to this argument by showing how the mobility of workers
makes it possible to learn foreign technologies and how a strong IPR regime in turn allows this knowledge
to be put into use among a more qualified skill profile in the home labor market.
The strength of IPR institutions here works as a moderating factor to exploit gains from diaspora
networks. The results obtained by stronger IPRs are compatible with various explanations for brain gain,
namely human capital incentives (Beine et al., 2001), return migration (Mayr and Peri, 2009), and access
to new knowledge through trade and FDI within diaspora networks (Agrawal et al., 2011). IPRs function
as an intermediary channel to exploit gains from migration by encouraging investment in education and
thereby human capital formation in the sending country. Better IPR protection also encourage return
migration of workers who have obtained better skills abroad back to the innovation sector of their home
country. They also trigger trade and investment by diasporas with their kins. Notwithstanding the
channel in play, one can conclude that skilled migration generates technology diffusion when institutional
development in the home country is sufficiently evolved to allow the absorption of knowledge flows through
human capital development, return migration, or diaspora networks. A simple theoretical framework to
illustrate this concept is presented in the Appendix.7
6Although a flow of workers into the innovation sector may increase the number of inventors, Helpman, et al. (2010)
argue that research productivity in the innovation sector may decline due to human capital complementarity as less talented
workers become researchers and reduce the average productivity of the team or because of managerial time constraint when
a fixed amount of time needs to be allocated to each worker.
7We refer the reader to the working paper version of this paper, Naghavi and Strozzi (2011), for a more complete version
of the theoretical framework.
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3. Empirical Analysis
3.1. Data and Specification
Our empirical analysis uses a sample of emerging and developing countries as classified by IMF (2010).
The innovation measure we adopt is resident patent grants, i.e., the number of patents granted to the
residents of each country from their local national patent office.8 Patent data are from the WIPO database.
Our migration measure is the gross migrant stock, which is retrieved from an original bilateral annual
dataset which includes bilateral migration stocks and flows from 129 countries of the world into 27
OECD countries.9 To retrieve the emigration data for each origin country, we aggregate the bilateral
migration data across countries of origin. Intellectual property rights are measured through the Park
(2008) index, which measures the strength of patent protection for each country in the dataset. The
index is the unweighted sum of five separate scores: coverage, membership in international treaties,
duration of protection, enforcement mechanisms, and restrictions.
Our reference dataset is an unbalanced panel including 34 EDC countries and covering the period from
1995 to 2006.10 While patent and migration data are available yearly, the index of IPR protection is only
available every five years. Taking into account the frequency of the IPR data, our dataset is composed of
5-year averages. This also allows us to wipe out the role of cyclical fluctuations in the data.11
To investigate whether a stronger IPR regime can mitigate the brain drain caused by migration, we
focus on the interrelationship between migration and IPR protection. To this end, we study the determi-
nants of home innovation using an empirical specification that consists of migration, IPR protection and
their interaction as key variables.
The estimation strategy we adopt takes into account both the characteristics of our sample and the
specificity of the WIPO patent data at country level. While in our sample there are no countries with
8For the benefits of using patent statistics to measure innovation, see Griliches (1990). Along with input data such as
research and development (R&D) expenditures and the human capital employed in research, patents have become the most
common measure of innovation output (Hall et al., 2001) and of knowledge spillovers (Mancusi, 2008). In particular, we use
patent grants as they can be considered a proxy for ”successful” innovation and therefore a stronger measure of innovation
compared to patent applications.
9The migration data have been collected by Mariola Pytlikova, who kindly provided us with the data (Pedersen et al.,
2008; Pedersen and Pytlikova, 2008). See Appendix A.2 for details, which also provides further information regarding other
data and sources used.
10The countries in the sample have been chosen based on data availability. The sample consists of the following 34 emerging
and developing countries (EDC): Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Colombia, Ecuador, Egypt,
Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, India, Iran, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Lithuania, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco,
Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, and Vietnam.
11See Trefler (2004).
6
zero patents (see below on Table 1), it may very well be that for very poor countries a missing data on
patents represents a zero: where the proportion of missing values is relevant, this could result in biased
OLS estimates. However, since in our dataset missing observations comprise only 10% of the sample, this
is not a crucial problem of our data.12 Our choice is hence to perform our estimations using fixed effects
regression methods at country level.
The baseline empirical specification we adopt is the following:
patentsit = β0 + β1emigrit−1 + β2IPRit + β3emigrit−1IPRit +
+γpopit + δgdppcit + αi + ηt + εit,
where i denotes the country and t each of the 5-year intervals.13 The dependent variable patentsit is our
measure of innovation. The variable emigrit−1 represents emigration and is taken with a lag, to account
for the time needed for the emigrants to acquire skills in the destination and for the knowledge to be
transferred back and transformed into a patent in their home countries. IPRit is the measure of IPR
protection. The variable emigrit−1IPRit is the interaction term between emigration and IPR protection.
The cumulative effect of migration on innovation is then captured by adding β1 and β3IPRt, and varies
with the level of IPR protection. popit and gdppcit are respectively population and GDP per capita,
included to account for size effects. Finally, the αi ’s are time-invariant country-specific effects, the ηt’s
are period dummies, and εit is the error term.
Following the related literature, we complete the baseline specification by including a number of
relevant controls. First, we add patent stock, which can be considered a proxy for a country’s absorptive
capacity and is expected to positively influence innovation (Hall et al., 2001).14 We also add R&D
expenditure, another proxy for a country’s potential for innovation. Another relevant control is tertiary
12More generally, it is worth pointing out that most missing values on WIPO patents data at country level should not
represent zeros and are continuously being estimated and updated by WIPO (WIPO, 2008).
13The time intervals we use are 1995-99, 2000-04 and 2005-06. The last interval is only composed of two years since our
sample ends in 2006. Data from 1990 till 1994 were used to construct the lagged data on emigration stocks for the interval
1995-99.
14To derive the patent stock series, we use the perpetual inventory method (Coe and Helpman, 2005). The patent stock
(PS) of country i at time t is PSi,t = PSi,t−1(1 − d) + Pi,t−1, where d is the depreciation rate and P is patent flow. The
initial value of patent stock (i.e., at time t0) is expressed as follows: PSi,t0 = Pi,t0/(g + d), where g is the average growth
rate of patent flow (Griliches, 1979). We assume a depreciation rate of 15% (Hall et al., 2001) and take g as the average
growth rate of patents in the first decade of available and reliable data of the patent series, i.e., starting from year 1990. As
specified in the Appendix, the patent series start from 1985. However, consistent and complete data are only available from
the 1990s.
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education, to capture the ability to absorb new knowledge. Government spending is added to measure
the degree of economic freedom. Finally, trade and FDI are included in light of a rich literature on North-
South trade and FDI as determinants of innovation in low-income countries. For details on the sources of
the variables, see the Appendix.15 Table 1 illustrates the summary statistics of the key variables of our
analysis.
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
Table 1: Summary Statistics
First differences
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Resident Patent Grants 122 4.369 2.156 0.130 0.758
Patent Stock 112 5.992 2.214 0.302 0.493
Emigration Stock 135 12.558 1.718 0.379 0.478
IPR 102 3.040 0.851 0.594 0.619
Population 129 17.028 1.499 0.043 0.056
GDP p.c. 128 8.504 0.782 0.124 0.171
R&D 109 0.482 0.321 0.045 0.129
Tertiary Education 122 0.290 0.193 0.051 0.068
Government Spending 132 0.714 0.193 -0.003 0.074
Trade 127 0.803 0.404 0.066 0.168
FDI 135 0.036 0.033 0.013 0.024
Note: The summary statistics are calculated with reference to the time interval
under consideration (1995-2006). The first three columns of the table refer to
the original variables we consider in our sample, while the last two columns re-
port mean and standard deviation of their first differences. Residents Patents,
Resident Patent Stock, Emigration stock, Population and GDP per capita are
in logarithms; R&D, Tertiary Education, Trade and FDI are represented in
shares; IPR is the Park’s index of IPR protection and lies between 0 and 5. All
the variables are taken in 5-year averages.
3.2. Results
Table 2 presents our results with resident patent grants as dependent variable. The migration variable
is gross emigration stocks. We initially consider three specifications where we explore the role of migration
and IPRs, first separately and then together (columns (1)-(3)), always including the two controls for size
effects (population and GDP per capita). As we can see from the table, in these specifications the
coefficients on the variables of interest are not statistically significant. The coefficients of the size controls
are positive and significant, as expected. Column (4) is our baseline specification and explores the joint
15In our empirical specifications the following variables are taken in logs: patent grants, patent stock, emigration stock,
population, and GDP per capita. The rest of the variables (IPR protection, tertiary education, government spending, trade,
FDI) are taken using their original values.
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role of our three main variables of interest: emigration, IPR protection, and their interaction. The findings
show that taken together our three main variables of interest are highly significant.
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]
In line with the vast literature discussed in the introduction, the negative and significant coefficient of
emigration suggests that migration by itself could induce brain drain.16 At the same time, the negative
and significant effect of IPRs resembles previous empirical findings by Qian (2007) that IPR protection
by itself does not stimulate domestic innovation in developing countries with low educational attainment.
It is also in accordance with Madsen et al. (2010), who show imitation to be a much more important
means of gaining access to essential technologies in developing countries. Lerner (2009) also finds that
IPRs increase foreign rather than domestic patenting in a country and thus the capturing of national
patent monopoly rights mainly by foreign firms (Lanjouw and Cockburn, 2001).17
The key to our analysis is the sign and significance of the interaction term between migration and
IPR protection. Our baseline specification in column (4) shows that the interaction term is highly signif-
icant and positive. This suggests that IPR protection becomes more strongly correlated with domestic
innovation in the presence of the diaspora channel of knowledge transfer that originates from migration.
Columns (5) to (10) in turn add the controls to our baseline specification: patent stock, R&D expendi-
ture, education, government spending, trade and FDI. As the results demonstrate, the coefficients of our
three main variables of interest always remain significant with the same sign as in the baseline specifica-
tion: migration and IPR protection are negative, and the interaction term is positive and significant. The
results also show that patent stock, trade and FDI have a significant role as determinants of innovation.
The positive sign of patent stock suggests that innovation is stronger in the presence of a higher level
of absorptive capacity; this implicitly confirms that the diaspora channel of knowledge is more effective
when the ability to absorb new knowledge is high.18 The coefficient of trade is positive and significant,
16We are aware of the limitations of the data we use, which only allows to capture total migration from developing countries.
However, the fact that migration to the OECD area in the 1990s has been increasingly composed of high-skilled immigrants
from the South (Docquier and Rapoport, 2012) should reinforce the interpretation of our results and thereby help mitigate
related concerns.
17IPR protection also negatively affects patenting by delaying spillovers in sequential innovation (Scotchmer and Green,
2000), creating wasteful attempts to invent around the patent (Jaffe and Lerner, 2004), and promoting costly disputes and
excessive litigation (Bessen and Meurer, 2009).
18In line with Cohen and Levinthal (1990), absorptive capacity is the capacity to adopt new technologies and to create
new inventions. Essential to this concept is the idea that the stock of knowledge accumulated through adoption or invention
enhances the capacity to absorb external ideas and to create valuable inventions. In this sense, patent stock, which represents







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































highlighting the expected importance of trade in fostering innovation. The coefficient of FDI is instead
negative and significant. This could be explained by the fact that inward FDI has a negative effect on the
productivity of local domestic firms through the existence of negative externalities (Aitken and Harrison,
1999) and/or that foreign entrants often displace local firms to less-innovative market segments (see e.g.,
Cantwell, 1989). R&D appears instead insignificant in our results but its positive sign is intuitive and
follows the main predictions of the relevant literature: the more efforts are devoted to R&D, the greater
is a country’s potential for innovation. Tertiary education appears to be insignificant, while its negative
sign could be due to the fact that highly educated people in developing countries may prefer to apply for
patents in more advanced economies. Government spending is also insignificant here; its negative sign
could be explained by the fact that a low share of government spending appears to be positively related
to the degree of economic freedom, as measured by the country’s reliance on personal choice and markets
(Gwartney and Lawson, 2000).
In column (11) we finally put all the significant variables together in the same regression: this is
our reference full specification. As we can see from the table, also in this case our key variables are
significant and of the correct predicted sign. The role of our key variables is also highlighted by the
results of the F-test for the joint significance of their coefficients, which we present throughout Table 2.
In our reference full specification, the F-test is significant at 5%. In the top panel of Figure 1 we show
the partial regression plots for the interaction term between migration and IPRs on patent grants for our
reference full specification.19
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
In the online Appendix we report our sensitivity analyses, together with additional checks. Table
OA.1 presents the results of a balanced sample to check whether the findings of Table 2 are sensitive to
the sample considered: the sample we use is that of our full specification in column (11). Tables OA.2
and OA.3 use alternative functional forms for IPRs. In the former table we use the logarithm of IPRs to
explore whether an increment in the IPR index has different effects according to the starting degree of
IPR protection. In the latter we build a dichotomous indictor using the average value of IPRs in EDC
countries as the reference threshold (where ”strong IPR” equals 1 if the country is above the average
19The role of outliers is investigated by eliminating the observations with studentized residuals that exceed +2.5 or -2.5 in
our baseline regression. This drops a total of four observations from the sample. Our main findings are unchanged. Results
are available upon request.
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value in a particular year and 0 otherwise). This allow us to single out the extent to which the effect of a
change in emigration is greater for nations with strong IPRs than those with weak IPRs. As we can see
from the tables, our key findings remain the same in all cases.20
In Tables OA.4 and OA.5 we also propose a first check of our basic idea about the channel of knowledge
flow. Since we claim that emigrants promote innovation in their home countries if their host countries
have a high potential for innovation, we need to rule out the possibility that knowledge transfer originates
from other channels such as trade between the two countries or FDI. Along these lines, in Table OA.4
we explore the role of two interaction terms, one including trade and migration and the other FDI and
migration. Both variables are estimated together with our main interaction term (Emigr. Stock*IPR).
In all cases their coefficient is insignificant, while our key interaction remains positive and significant.
In Table OA.5 we also check the link between innovation in the origin and indexes of heterogeneity in
the destination in terms of innovation capacity (measured by patent grants or R&D), trade, and FDI.21
When the index is built on innovation-related characteristics of the host country, the results are positive
and significant (more for R&D expenditure than for patent intensity). GDP per capita in the destination,
trade and FDI instead do not seem to play a role in transferring knowledge between emigrants and
residents in their home country. The results confirm the importance of IPRs at home and diasporas in
more innovative destinations as a channel of technology transfer, combining the mechanisms of knowledge
flow explored in the context of multinationals by Branstetter et al. (2006) and Foley and Kerr (2013).
3.3. Robustness Checks
In this section, we present some key robustness checks of our results. We deal in particular with the
potential endogeneity of one of our main variables of interest, namely emigration stock. While reverse
causality is unlikely to be responsible for the relationship between patents at home and lagged total
emigration stock, the omitted variable bias can be a major source of endogeneity in our context. In
particular, patent grants, IPRs and emigration may be jointly influenced by omitted variables. For
example, developing countries that adopt a technology focus (such as China and India) could be more
likely than others to strengthen their IPRs, invest in education (potentially leading to more emigration),
20We also run additional sensitivity checks. We investigate the monotonicity of the relationship between patents, IPR and
migration adding a squared IPR term to the regression. We also construct an alternative IPR dummy variable with the
reference group being the bottom categories of the IPR index (i.e. with a value less than 2). The results remain the same
and are available upon request.
21The details for the construction of these indexes are given in Appendix A.3.
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and invest in technology development in ways that increase patenting. Therefore, we cannot necessarily
infer a causal link between emigration and patents and cannot conclude that strengthening IPRs fosters
innovation via more effective knowledge that flows back from the diaspora. In what follows we address
this issue through a first difference and an instrumental variables approach.
3.3.1. First Differences
Together with fixed effects and a proper configuration of the control variables, the first difference
technique can help mitigate some of the concerns related to omitted variables. While the fixed effects
(within) estimator is derived by subtracting the time-average model from the original model, the first
difference estimator is obtained by subtracting the model lagged by one period from the original model.
In other words, the first difference model removes the time-invariant individual components by first-
differencing the data. The relative efficiency of the first difference estimator with respect to the fixed
effects estimator depends on the properties of the error term. In particular, the first difference estimator
requires weaker exogeneity assumptions, and it is usually preferred if the errors are serially correlated.22
Our first difference estimates are presented in the regressions of Table 3.
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]
The specifications in the table replicate those of Table 2, starting from the specification that includes
our three main variables of interest. The findings confirm the robustness of our previous results: the
coefficient of our key variables of interest (migration, IPR and the interaction term) have the same sign as
before and remain significant. The joint F-test again confirms the joint significance of our key variables.
The bottom panel of Figure 1 illustrates the partial regression plots for the interaction term between
migration and IPRs in our full specification for the first difference analysis. While these results are in line
with our fixed effects estimates, it is worth pointing out that they are derived from a small set of countries
and here are measured over only two periods. To further investigate the effect of migration on brain drain,
we proceed by considering the changes in the effect of emigration on innovation according to the IPR
regime in the sending country. Figure 2 illustrates the marginal effect of emigration on resident patent
grants for different levels of IPR protection, together with its 95% confidence interval. The reference
specification is the full specification of Table 3 (column (11)).
22Indeed, while the fixed effects estimator assumes that the error terms are serially uncorrelated, the first difference







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]
As the figure suggests, while under weak IPR protection migration has a strong negative effect on
resident patents, IPR protection mitigates this effect by using the knowledge acquired by diasporas to
foster innovation. Note however that even at the maximum protection level (IPRt = 5) the positive effect
of β3IPRt may not fully compensate the unfavorable impact of migration through β1.
3.3.2. Instrumental Variables
We next employ an instrumental variable approach (2SLS) to help alleviate endogeneity concerns
regarding one of our main variables of interest, migration stock. Although the fixed effects as well as
the first differences specifications in the previous estimations address the issue of omitted variable bias,
further exercises that account for time-variant omitted factors are needed to provide more compelling
evidence of a genuine link between emigration, IPRs, and domestic innovation.
The first step is to find a suitable instrument for emigration that is correlated with emigration but not
directly with the endogenous variable, patent grants. We adopt two types of instruments that we believe
satisfy this requirement.
In the spirit of Frankel and Romer (1999), our main instrument for migration (IVgrav) exploits
information on the determinants of migration used in the gravity literature to derive a measure of predicted
emigration stocks.23 Bilateral migration is generally determined by various economic, political, cultural
and geographic factors. Since the focus of our framework is on innovation and IPRs, we cannot use the
full set of bilateral variables as in standard gravity models. In particular, we cannot use economic and
institutional factors as this could create an endogeneity problem with our two main variables of interest,
i.e. migration and IPRs. We hence specify the following gravity model for migration:
migrijt = a0popit + a1popjt + a2areait + a3areajt + a4distij + a5borderij + a6landlockedij
+a7comlang offij + a8comlang defij + a9colonyij + a10migrij1960 + bXijdij + xt + eijt
where migrijt is the migration stock from origin country i to destination country j in year t, popit , popjt,
areait and areajt are the population and the area of i and j, distij is distance between i and j, borderij
and landlockedij are dummies indicating whether i and j share a common border or if either of them
23See e.g. Spilimbergo (2009), Mayda (2010), Beine et al. (2013), Alesina et al. (2013), and Ortega and Peri (2014).
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is a landlocked country, comlang offij and comlang defij are dummies denoting whether i and j share
a common official primary language or a de facto language that is spoken by at least 9 percent of the
population in both i and j, and colonyij is a dummy to capture colonial past between i and j.
24 We add to
this a measure of past bilateral migration stock from i to j in 1960, migrij1960,
25 and a set of interactions
Xijdij between the vector of geographical variables Xij (distij , popit , popjt, areait, areajt) and each
dummy dij (borderij, landlockedij, comlang offij, comlang defij). Finally, xt is a year fixed effect
and eijt is the error term.
26 Once we have estimated the gravity regressions using the information from
our staring bilateral annual dataset, we aggregate them across origin countries to obtain the predicted
migration stocks for each country. We then collapse the predicted stocks in five-year averages. The gravity
regressions are shown in Panel B of Table A.1 in Appendix A.4. We present six gravity models that differ
with respect to the sets of interaction terms that have been included. We consider in particular the
interactions between each of the chosen dummies (Border, Colony, Official Language, De Facto Language
and Landlocked) and the vector X of geographical variables (Distance, Population Destination, Population
Origin, Area Destination, Area Origin).
The first-stage results of our instrumental variables analysis are shown in Panel A of Table A.1. Each
column uses the fitted emigration stock derived from the six gravity models in Panel B of the same table.
Although emigration stock (ES) is the only potential endogenous variable in our empirical specification, it
also appears in the interaction term (ES*IPR). We hence use IVgrav as an instrument for ES and interact
it with the IPR protection index to provide an instrument for the interaction term. Our first stage results
show that the fitted emigration stocks are good predictors for migration and for the interaction term.
Table 4 presents the results obtained using the IVgrav-type instruments derived from the six gravity
models in Panel B Table A.1 (e.g. column (1) in Table 4 uses the predicted migration stock from the
gravity model of column (1) in Panel B of Table A.1). The 2SLS regressions with the chosen instruments
use our reference full specification. As the results show, our main variables of interest remain significant
and with the correct sign also when the potential endogeneity of migration is taken into account. Moreover,
the tests on the performance of the first stage regressions are all significant and show that our instruments
are valid. The results show that the OLS estimates slightly overestimate the 2SLS estimates, as expected.
24Data has been taken from CEPII, see Head et al. (2010).
25We use historical data on 1960 immigration stock constructed by Özden et al. (2011).
26We also define additional gravity models that only consist of the key geographical variables together with destination
and origin, or just destination fixed effects.
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[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]
We also employ a secondary instrument for migration (IVlaw), which exploits information on a key
institutional feature associated with migration costs, i.e. the stringency of entry laws in destination
countries. The idea here is to use the information regarding exogenous shocks to emigration that emerge
as a result of immigration policy changes in destination countries.27 To select the relevant entry laws for
each origin country, we use information on geographical distance and cultural similarity between the origin
and the destination. We first use our bilateral dataset to distinguish between near and far destinations by
observing whether they lie within or outside a 3000 km distance from the origin.28 We further categorize
far countries into those that share a common language with the origin and those that do not.29 The aim
is to capture the fact that those who emigrate to countries far from their homeland are more inclined to
go to places that share a common language, compensating for costs associated with geographical distance.
Finally, we collect the entry laws relevant for each country of origin, considering as relevant the entry laws
of all near countries, plus those of far countries that share a common language. Once we have collected
the information from our bilateral annual dataset, we first aggregate the data across origin countries and
then collapse them in 5-year averages.
Table OA.6 of the Appendix includes our findings obtained with IVlaw instruments using different
measures of distance and language proximity across countries.30 It can be seen from the table that all
our variables continue to be significant with the predicted sign. However, the results on the performance
of first stage regressions appear less satisfactory. In addition, the number of observations used is much
lower than that in our reference sample. As a consequence, although the sign and the significance of the
coefficients using IVlaw confirm our core results, we lean more towards the IVgrav estimates and consider
them as our primary check for the endogeneity of the migration variable.
To summarize, in all the empirical specifications and robustness checks we perform, the effects of our
three main variables of interest on patents are largely robust: migration is negative and significant, IPR
27We use data on immigration policies that regulate the entry of immigrants in destination countries from Ortega and Peri
(2013). We use an ordinal proxy from 1 to 3 with a higher value indicating more lenient entry laws.
28The classification is based on differentiating between short-haul and medium/long-haul flight destinations. A widely
agreed defintion for a short-haul flight is a flight under 3000 km. See, for example, ”Short/medium-haul widebody airliner
market 2013”, www.flightglobal.com.
29Note that if countries share a common border, destination countries are classified as ”near” also if the distance among
countries is more than 3000 km. This is for example the case of Mexico and the United States.
30As an indicator of distance, columns (1)-(2) use the geodesic distance across countries, whereas columns (3)-(4) use the
distance between capitals. Columns (1) and (3) use the measure of common language taken from CEPII, whereas columns
(2) and (4) use a dummy for linguistic similarity from Adsera and Pytlikova (2012).
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Table 4: The Impact of Emigration and IPR Protection on Innovation.
Instrumental Variables (2SLS) with IVgrav
Dependent variable: patentsit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
IV1 IV2 IV3 IV4 IV5 IV6
Emigration Stock -0.627** -0.609** -0.706*** -0.627** -0.620** -0.612**
(0.262) (0.265) (0.240) (0.263) (0.268) (0.266)
IPR -2.133** -2.076* -2.425** -2.148** -2.094* -2.094**
(1.046) (1.074) (0.977) (1.061) (1.078) (1.060)
Emigr. Stock*IPR 0.158** 0.154** 0.180** 0.159** 0.155** 0.155**
(0.0762) (0.078) (0.071) (0.078) (0.079) (0.077)
Population 3.686*** 3.682*** 3.754*** 3.704*** 3.664*** 3.692***
(1.209) (1.213) (1.225) (1.213) (1.220) (1.203)
GDP p.c. 0.953 0.962 0.909 0.951 0.958 0.959
(0.641) (0.638) (0.663) (0.641) (0.636) (0.638)
Patent Stock 0.807*** 0.807*** 0.806*** 0.806*** 0.808*** 0.807***
(0.207) (0.207) (0.210) (0.208) (0.207) (0.207)
Trade 1.726** 1.723** 1.748** 1.730** 1.721** 1.725**
(0.707) (0.709) (0.698) (0.708) (0.709) (0.709)
FDI -6.438*** -6.511*** -6.080*** -6.425*** -6.480*** -6.492***
(2.084) (2.088) (2.128) (2.097) (2.082) (2.082)
Country Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R-squared 0.307 0.306 0.306 0.306 0.307 0.306
Angrist-Pisckhe F test for ES 18.65 18.66 18.06 18.11 18.69 17.25
Kleibergen-Paap F test 18.90 21.81 18.42 16.89 16.46 16.72
Anderson-Rubin Wald test 5.316 4.938 8.107 5.419 4.911 4.919
Observations 83 83 83 83 83 83
Number of groups 30 30 30 30 30 30
SY 10% max IV size 7.03 7.03 7.03 7.03 7.03 7.03
SY 25% max IV size 3.63 3.63 3.63 3.63 3.63 3.63
Note: The dependent variable patentsit is the logarithm of the number of patents granted to the residents of
each country from their local national patent office. Emigration stock and the its interaction with IPR pro-
tection are instrumented using IVgrav, i.e. a measure of predicted emigration stock using the six different
gravity models from Panel B of Table A.1 (IV1-IV6). All regressions include country and time fixed effects.
Observations are at 5-year intervals. Standardized ’beta’ coefficients are reported with their standard errors
in brackets, adjusted for clustering at the country level. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10
percent levels, respectively. Patent stock, emigration stock, population and GDP per capita are also in log-
arithms. The Angrist-Pisckhe F test for ES reports the first-stage F statistics for test of weak identification
of our endogenous regressor, Emigration Stock (ES). The Kleibergen-Paap F test is the Kleibergen-Paap rk
Wald F statistic and performs a weak identification test for our endogenous regressors when standard errors
are clustered. Its critical values are 7.03 and 3.63 for a rejection rate of 10% and 25%, respectively (Stock and
Yogo, 2005), as shown in rows SY 10% and SY 25%. The Anderson-Rubin Wald test reports a test for the
joint significance of the endogenous regressors in the structural equation and is distributed as a chi-squared
with degrees of freedom equal to the number of excluded instruments. The first stage estimates of the 2SLS
regressions are presented in Panel A of Table A.1. Emigration stock is lagged by one period. IPR protection
is measured by the Park (2008) index (0-5 scale, 0=weak, 5=strong).
18
protection is negative and significant and the interaction term between migration and IPR protection is
positive and significant.
4. Conclusion
This paper sheds light on the joint role of institutions and migration in promoting innovation and
contributes to the rich debates about the suitability of IPR protection and the brain drain effects of
emigration in developing countries. We ask the question whether political instruments such as IPR
protection can generate a win-win scenario out of emigration. Our analysis shows that IPR protection
can be beneficial for innovation by exploiting the resources of knowledge made available through diaspora
networks. We highlight a process of knowledge transfer from the developed to the developing world
independent of trade and FDI that mainly relies on the movement of labor. The focus of the analysis is
on the potential relationship between knowledge absorbed by emigrants abroad and the efficacy of IPRs
in promoting innovation in their home countries.
Our conceptual framework assumes that emigration may trigger the flow of knowledge between skilled
emigrants and natives. Using a sample of emerging and developing countries, we explore the link between
international migration and innovation capacity in migrants’ countries of origin and show that IPR pro-
tection works as a moderating factor between the two. We argue that migration helps provide the missing
source of knowledge required for IPR protection to stimulate domestic innovation in developing countries.
Although skilled emigration out of a developing country may directly result in the well-known concept
of brain drain, it can be supportive for innovation in the country of origin, depending on the strength of
IPR institutions.
While these results highlight the role of IPR protection in promoting the beneficial effects of interna-
tional migration, one should be cautious in interpreting and/or generalizing the results of such macro-level
analyses. For instance, there may be other policies being adjusted alongside the IPR regime, which could
contribute towards capacity building and potential for development. Acknowledging the limitations inher-
ent to the interpretations that can be deduced from our framework, our research has aimed to highlight
the importance of the interplay between international migration and IPRs in the global flow of knowledge
and to lay a foundation for further research and data collection on these premises.
19
AppendixA. Appendix
AppendixA.1. A Simple Theory
To pin down the idea that the strength of IPR institutions can exploit the gains from diaspora
networks, we take a simplified version of Ohnsorge and Trefler (2007) model of heterogeneous workers and
introduce in it an innovation sector, migration and IPR protection. Suppose a developing country, where
individuals are endowed with a minimum level of human capital normalized to 1, and are heterogeneous
in their learning ability zi. Each individual lives two periods. In the first period, they all work and earn
wages normalized 1, but can also pay e to invest in education. This allows them to earn a wage 1 + zi
according to their innate ability. Those who forego education continue to earn 1. The lack of an adequate
IPR regime reduces returns to their skills by lowering their ability to retain monopoly profits for their
inventions: 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 represents an inverse measure of IPR protection where γ = 0 denotes full protection
and maximum profits, and γ = 1 indicates no protection with perfect competition driving profits to zero.
Migration provides inventors with the opportunity to move to advanced countries where IPRs are fully
enforced. This allows them to earn maximum returns to their inventions zi, but entails a migration cost
m. The population therefore decides whether or not to invest in education in the first period, and faces
the option to emigrate in the second. Equation (A.1) shows the returns to the unskilled, the skilled who
remain in their home country, and the migrants, respectively:
v00 = 1 + 1, (A.1)
v10 = 1 − e+ 1 + zi(1 − γ),
v11 = 1 − e+ 1 + zi −m.
The first binary subscript stands for education and the second for migration.
The setting creates a continuum of agents assorted according to their capabilities with two thresh-
olds, z1 and z2, representing the agents who are indifferent about obtaining education and migrating,
respectively:
z1 = e/(1 − γ), (A.2)
z2 = m/γ.
Agents with ability zi < z1 do not invest in education, those with z1 < zi < z2 invest in education but
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stay home, and the highest skilled zi > z2 also migrate. An improvement of the IPR regime (reducing
γ) shrinks the size of the population in the first and the third zone (uneducated and migrants), whereas
those in the middle who are capable of producing domestic inventions increases. On the contrary, a weak
recognition of IPRs in the home country deters investment in education while inducing the more skilled
educated segment to emigrate. The positive relationship between IPRs and the number of potential
inventors is in line with evidence plotted in Figure A.1, which shows a strong positive and significant
correlation (0.6423*) between the IPR regime and tertiary education for the countries in our sample.
[FIGURE A.1 ABOUT HERE]
Consider two exogenously given levels of IPR protection: weak (γW ) and strong (γS), where 0 < γS <
γW < 1. A strong IPR regime results in a lower (higher) value of z1 (z2), increasing the middle range
consisting of the educated population in the home country, z1 < zi < z2. An increase in emigration can be
shown through a marginal reduction in migration costs m. It follows from (A.2) that a lower m induces
migration by shifting the threshold z2 to the left. This creates an immediate brain drain effect through a
depletion of skills of the potential inventors who leave the country. However, migration facilitates access to
foreign information and technologies, which can eventually flow back through diaspora channels described
above. This effect is larger, the more human capital is actively employed in the country of origin who can
utilize the knowledge, i.e. the larger is the middle region z1 < zi < z2, which is the case under a strong
IPR regime, γS .
AppendixA.2. Data Description and Sources
Patents
We use resident patent grants, which are patents granted in each country to its residents by the local
national patent office. The data are annual and the source is WIPO (2011). The data version we use
is that of January 2011 and the series we retrieved is ”Patent grants by patent office, broken down by
resident and non-resident (1883-2009)”. Patent stock series are calculated using the perpetual inventory
method and a 15% depreciation rate. For details on this method, see the main text.
Migration
As migration measure, we use stocks of emigrants abroad. The data are annual. Emigration stocks
are derived by summing the available bilateral immigration stocks by country of origin into 27 OECD
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countries. The original bilateral migration dataset collects information from different statistical offices
of the world, supplemented by published OECD statistics from “Trends in International Migration”
publications and Eurostat data. For a more comprehensive description of earlier versions of this dataset,
see Pedersen et al. (2008) and Pedersen and Pytlikova (2008).
Intellectual Property Rights
The source is Park (2008). The available data cover 123 countries over the period from 1960 to 2005
in five-year intervals. Given the focus of our study, we selected a sample of data starting in 1995. For
the missing values in each of the five-year intervals, we impute the index of patent protection, which is
defined for the starting year of the corresponding time interval.
Additional Controls
The additional controls (GDP, population, R&D, education, government spending, trade and FDI) are
from the World Bank (2009), IMF (2010), and the United Nations. All data have an annual frequency. The
education variable is measured by enrollment in tertiary education in Barro and Lee (2010). Geographical
data used in the gravity model are from CEPII as described in Head et al. (2010). Data on entry laws
are from Ortega and Peri (2013). Data on historical immigration stock comes from Özden et al. (2011).
AppendixA.3. The Channel of Knowledge Flow
We here propose a measure of the channel of knowledge flow across countries, which takes into account
the characteristics of the destination countries. The measure is a variant of Spilimbergo (2009). While
Spilimbergo argues that foreign-trained individuals promote democracy in their home countries if they
study in democratic countries, we here claim that emigrants promote innovation in their home countries
if their host countries have a high potential for innovation.
To capture the heterogeneity among destination countries, we construct an index composed of a
weighted average of the potential channels of knowledge, with the weights given by the share of emigrants
from each origin in each destination over total emigration stock from the origin. The Knowledge Channel








where i is the origin country, j is destination country and t denotes time. mij is the bilateral emigration
stock from country i to country j, Mi is total emigration stock from country i, and Ikj is the relevant
index of knowledge flow of type k from country j. By construction, the KCI lies between 0 and 1. To
build each of the k-type indexes of knowledge flow we adopt the following measures: the total number
of patents granted to the residents of each destination country over total population, R&D expenditure
in destination, GDP per capita in the destination and the value of bilateral trade and FDI between j
and i. Table OA.5 in the online appendix reports the role of each potential channel of knowledge flow
on resident patent grants. Comparing the results in columns (1)-(2) with columns (4)-(5) confirms our
hypothesis that innovation potential in the host country of migrants here plays a more important role
than alternative channels of knowledge transfer such as bilateral trade and FDI.
AppendixA.4. Appendix Table






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































IV 1 IV 2 IV 3 IV 4 IV 5 IV 6
Distance -0.163*** -0.166*** -0.181*** -0.186*** -0.185*** -0.163***
(0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.048) (0.048) (0.056)
Population Origin 0.520*** 0.531*** 0.534*** 0.514*** 0.511*** 0.518***
(0.033) (0.034) (0.032) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
Population Destination 0.343*** 0.345*** 0.337*** 0.346*** 0.345*** 0.356***
(0.030) (0.032) (0.030) (0.031) (0.031) (0.030)
Area Origin -0.132*** -0.133*** -0.126*** -0.100*** -0.097*** -0.141***
(0.029) (0.030) (0.029) (0.032) (0.032) (0.033)
Area Destination 0.168*** 0.170*** 0.180*** 0.192*** 0.173*** 0.203***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.028) (0.027) (0.028)
Border 0.313** 5.425** 0.345** 0.246 0.318* 0.287
(0.158) (2.355) (0.153) (0.167) (0.167) (0.192)
Colony 0.564** 0.568*** 4.503** 0.589*** 0.616*** 0.600***
(0.219) (0.213) (1.913) (0.216) (0.217) (0.220)
Official Language 0.444*** 0.395*** 0.416*** 2.882*** 0.433*** 0.468***
(0.148) (0.146) (0.144) (0.959) (0.146) (0.145)
De Facto Language 0.530*** 0.575*** 0.536*** 0.554*** 2.239* 0.491***
(0.148) (0.149) (0.145) (0.149) (1.160) (0.145)
Landlocked -0.902*** -0.899*** -0.887*** -0.899*** -0.899*** 0.189
(0.075) (0.075) (0.075) (0.075) (0.075) (0.798)
Past Migration 0.450*** 0.450*** 0.449*** 0.445*** 0.450*** 0.443***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014)
Constant -8.472*** -8.695*** -8.689*** -8.916*** -8.695*** -8.971***
(0.638) (0.661) (0.636) (0.666) (0.654) (0.642)
Time Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Border*X No Yes No No No No
Colony*X No No Yes No No No
Official Language*X No No No Yes No No
De Facto Language*X No No No No Yes No
Landlocked*X No No No No No Yes
Adj. R-squared 0.677 0.678 0.681 0.679 0.679 0.678
Observations 29669 29669 29669 29669 29669 29669
Number of groups 2002 2002 2002 2002 2002 2002
Note: The dependent variable migrijt is the logarithm of bilateral migration stock from origin country i to
destination country j in year t. All regressions include time fixed effects. Standardized ’beta’ coefficients are
reported with their standard errors in brackets, adjusted for clustering at the country level. ***, ** and *
indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. Each column includes a different set of
interaction terms. The included interaction terms are listed in the rows at the bottom of the table. Each row
represents the set of interactions between the chosen dummies (Border, Colony, Official Language, De Facto
Language and Landlocked) and the vector X of geographical variables (Distance, Population Destination,
Population Origin, Area Destination, Area Origin).
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Olena Ivus, Elisabetta Lodigiani, Çaglar Özden, Giovanni Prarolo, Farid Toubal and Daniel Trefler for
valuable comments and suggestions that helped us to substantially improve the paper. We would also like
to thank the seminar participants at University of Lille 1, the University of Bologna, EEA 2011 Oslo, GLO-
BELICS 2010 Kuala Lumpur, GLOBELICS 2011 Buenos Aires, International Workshop on Economics of
Global Interactions 2011 Bari, ITSG 2011 Milan, PRIN Workshop 2013 Bologna, RES 2012 Cambridge,
and the WIPO Experts’ Meeting on Intellectual Property, the International Mobility of Knowledge Work-
ers and the Brain Drain 2013 Geneva for very helpful remarks. We gratefully acknowledge the European
Commission for financial support through the 7th Framework Programme Project INGINEUS. Finan-
cial support from Fondazione Cassa Risparmio di Modena and from MIUR through the PRIN project
”Institutions, Social Dynamics, and Economic Development” is also gratefully acknowledged.
31
